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Abstract. Today, online privacy is the domain of regulatory measures and 
privacy-enhancing technologies. Transparency in the form of external and public 
assessments has been proposed for improving privacy and security because it 
exposes otherwise hidden deficiencies. Previous work has studied privacy 
attitudes and behavior of consumers. However, little is known on how 
organizations react to measures that employ public “naming and shaming” as an 
incentive for improvement. We performed the first study on this aspect by 
conducting a qualitative survey with 152 German health insurers. We scanned 
their websites with PrivacyScore.org to generate a public ranking and confronted 
the insurers with the results. We obtained a response rate of 27%. Responses 
ranged from positive feedback to legal threats. Only 12% of the sites – mostly 
non-responders – improved during our study. Our results show that insurers 
struggle due to unawareness, reluctance, and incapability, and demonstrate the 
general difficulties of transparency-based approaches. 
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1 Introduction 
Privacy plays an increasingly important role for consumers, regulators, and companies, 
especially on the internet. A growing number of companies provide services in the areas 
of online advertising, web analytics, and user profiling. Users and regulators have 
responded by deploying tracking blockers and passing stronger privacy laws, e.g., the 
European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). 
So far, most research has focused on user perceptions of information privacy [1–4] 
and models for firms’ data sharing gathering [5–7] and sharing behavior [8]. However, 
there is a lack of research on how to incentivize companies to reduce their use of 
tracking services, which are disliked by many users [9]. The study presented in this 
paper investigates the role of transparency as an incentive mechanism. Our scope is not 
limited to privacy (represented by online tracking services); we also consider the 
connected area of security (e.g., transport encryption of web and mail traffic), as they 
affect user privacy against malicious actors like criminals and intelligence agencies. 
Existing website scanners like the Qualys SSL Test (ssllabs.com) and Webbkoll [10] 
allow to assess security and privacy features of single sites. However, these scanners 
communicate the result only to the particular user who commissioned a scan. Therefore, 
there is little incentive for site operators to improve their rating. In contrast, we consider 
a scenario in which the scan results for multiple competing organizations are published 
openly on the internet in a ranking. This combination of publicity and comparability 
creates more transparency for consumers, which may increase the pressure on site 
operators to improve. Therefore, we pose the following research questions: 
 RQ1: How do website operators react when they are notified that their website has 
been rated in terms of privacy and security aspects and the results are publicly 
available online? 
 RQ2: Does telling them about being in a public ranking change their reaction? 
We seek to answer these questions by contacting 152 German health insurance 
providers in a qualitative study, confronting them with and asking their comment on 
the current state of information privacy on their websites as determined by the 
PrivacyScore platform [11]. PrivacyScore.org is a public web service that automatically 
analyzes websites for security and privacy issues. Since its inception in June 2017, it 
has performed over 1 million scans and is being used by activists, data protection 
officers, and the general public. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to 
investigate how the competitive nature of public privacy and security rankings affects 
website operators, using the ranking functionality offered by PrivacyScore. 
2 Related Work 
The majority of IS privacy research focuses on individual privacy [6]. One of the central 
questions in this area is how privacy concerns affect the way individuals behave and 
their willingness to disclose personal information [1]. A frequently discussed aspect in 
this context refers to the decisions that individuals make regarding privacy and a trade-
off between risk and benefit [3], which is informed by many factors, including company 
culture, legal environment, and the industry of the information-gathering company [4]. 
In contrast, there is less research on the question of how privacy issues are perceived 
from the organization perspective, i.e., by companies who work with personal data of 
their consumers. This field concerns itself with the interests and attitudes and 
motivations that companies have towards privacy [1, 5–8]. Greenaway and Chan argue 
that companies can behave in a reactive or proactive manner in regard to privacy and 
thus influence the perception of customers, and that their behavior can be explained 
using two models [5]. The Institutional Approach (IA) considers firms behavior as a 
search for legitimacy in the face of external pressures, and distinguishes an acquiescent 
(compliance with law, imitation of peers) and a proactive approach (exceeding 
minimum requirements and using clear communication to achieve leadership without 
falling out of line). The Resource-based View (RbV) posits that firms seek a sustainable 
competitive advantage using either an information- (through superior data analysis) or 
a customer focus (through superior customer trust). 
To the best of our knowledge, the role of competition in promoting privacy has not 
received significant attention so far, although individual companies like Apple1 or 
DuckDuckGo2 have started marketing themselves as privacy champions. Like the RbV, 
Ohlhausen and Okuliar view privacy as a factor in competition [12]. Kerber reverses 
the argument and posits that a lack of competition may be partially responsible for the 
lack of privacy offerings from online companies [13]. 
Another reason may be that the privacy behavior of companies is often invisible 
from the outside. Thus, consumers find it hard to check whether companies are living 
up to their claims, for instance by following accepted best practices that ensure the 
privacy and security of their customers. Transparency can make these invisible 
practices of companies visible, enabling customers to easily verify claims and compare 
the practices of competing companies. The IS transparency literature has so far been 
focused on transparency strategies for companies [14], but has not yet considered 
transparency provided by external actors in the field of information privacy. Such 
external transparency has been shown to improve outcomes in areas such as Corporate 
Social Responsibility [15] and corporate ethics [16], among others, making it a 
promising avenue for more research. 
3 Technical Background 
We use the platform PrivacyScore.org [11] to investigate how operators of websites 
react when they are confronted with the fact that a third party is creating transparency 
about the privacy and security practices exhibited by their websites. 
PrivacyScore.org3 is an automated website scanner that allows anyone to investigate 
websites regarding privacy and security issues. Compared to other website scanners 
like Qualys SSL Scan and Webbkoll, the scans conducted by PrivacyScore are more 
comprehensive, including both security and privacy aspects. Currently, PrivacyScore 
performs more than 60 checks in four groups: Tracking and Privacy checks if a website 
includes third-party trackers. Website Encryption checks if a web server offers state-of-
the-art secure connections, whether it redirects users to the secure version of the site, 
and whether it sets the HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS)4 header, which prevents 
certain classes of attacks. Mail Encryption checks whether the mail servers of a website 
support state-of-the-art encryption, and Web Security checks if a website leaks internal 
information [17] and whether it protects users against client-side attacks. 
Detailed results of each scan are published on the website and retained in a database 
to facilitate longitudinal studies. While it is possible to scan individual websites with 
                                                          
1 https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/25/in-privacy-fight-apple-has-more-to-lose-than-facebook-or-
google.html (accessed 2018-11-16) 
2 https://www.theverge.com/2017/1/25/14381138/duckduckduckgo-privacy-anonymous-
searching-10-billion (accessed 2018-11-16) 
3 The first and third authors of this paper are members of the PrivacyScore team. 
4 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6797 (accessed 2018-11-19) 
PrivacyScore, it is primarily intended to be used to scan lists of related websites (e.g., 
all pharmacies with an online shop in a specific country). Scanning a list generates a 
public ranking with all sites that belong to a list. Rankings put the individual scan results 
into context and allow consumers, data protection authorities, and site operators to 
assess how a particular site compares with its competitors. At the time of writing 
PrivacyScore hosts over 200 scan lists and has conducted more than 1 million scans. 
A noteworthy limitation of PrivacyScore is that it conducts scans automatically 
without human oversight. As a result, the assessment is limited to aspects that can be 
reliably verified programmatically from the outside by visiting the website with an 
instrumented web browser. In particular, PrivacyScore cannot verify whether 
statements in the privacy policy are adequate and whether the site actually adheres to 
them. Moreover, PrivacyScore conducts only benign checks. For instance, it does not 
actively attempt to find and exploit vulnerabilities in the website under test. 
Finally, PrivacyScore attempts to find a fair balance between satisfying the desire 
for transparency of consumers and operational interests of site operators. To this end, 
all scans are conducted instantaneously, i.e., without asking operators for permission. 
Website operators can have their website excluded from future scans. For reasons of 
transparency, this fact is published next to the scan results. Moreover, the last successful 
scan result before the complaint is shown for the respective site. 
4 Study Design 
As proposed by Greenaway and Chan [5], we use a mixed method [18] approach by 
combining a classical open question survey with a quasi-experimental setup based on 
the PrivacyScore platform. We follow a qualitative research process consisting of 
planning, data gathering, preparation of analysis, and analysis and summarization [19]. 
4.1 Gathering Websites and Scan Results 
Our focus is on the health insurance sector within Germany, as visitors of health 
insurance websites may disclose sensitive information (e.g., by looking up information 
about specific illnesses and treatments). We obtained the homepage addresses (domain 
names) of all public and private health insurers in Germany from Wikipedia,5 uploaded 
the URLs to PrivacyScore and added them to the newly created scan list “Deutsche 
Krankenkassen und Krankenversicherungen” (privacyscore.org/list/15). In December 
2017 (T1) we saved a local copy of the scan result for each website as well as its rank 
within the aforementioned list. We performed two additional scans at later points in 
time (February and August 2018; T2 and T3) to determine whether the insurers had 
changed security and privacy properties of their sites. 
                                                          
5 https://de.wikipedia.org/w/?title=Liste_deutscher_Krankenkassen&oldid=180861868 and 
https://de.wikipedia.org/w/?title=Liste_deutscher_privater_Krankenversicherer&oldid=1807
52925 (accessed 2018-09-11) 
4.2 Group Allocation 
Seeking to answer RQ2 we use a quasi-experimental setup, which is common in 
organizational research [20]. We split the insurers into two groups A and B, introducing 
the variable competition. We prepared two kinds of solicitation emails. Insurers in 
Group A were only informed about the overall scan results for their site in terms of the 
four areas that are published on the PrivacyScore website: “Tracking and Privacy”, 
“Website Encryption”, “Mail Encryption”, and “Web Security”. Insurers in Group B 
were additionally confronted with the rank of their site in our “Deutsche Krankenkassen 
und Krankenversicherungen” scan list. All solicitation emails started out with a brief 
description of PrivacyScore and ended with a request to participate in our study by 
answering the following two open questions: What do you think about this kind of an 
assessment from a company’s point of view? Would you consider making changes to 
your website in order to improve its privacy properties? 
The group allocation was not randomized but based on the ranking of the websites 
on PrivacyScore. This was done to ensure that both groups are homogenous in terms of 
the distribution of the ranks as given by the scan list. To this end, we assigned the 
numbers from 1 to 152 to the insurers in the order of the PrivacyScore ranking. The 
companies with odd numbers were put into Group A, those with even numbers into 
Group B. This procedure was guaranteed to result in two groups of the same size and 
allowed us to handle cases of ties in a deterministic fashion. Note that our allocation 
resulted in an uneven distribution in terms of the type of insurer: Group A contained 61 
public and 15 private insurers, whereas Group B contained 51 and 25, respectively. 
This heterogeneity will be taken into account during the analysis.  
4.3 Sending of Solicitation Mails 
We obtained an email address for every insurer by visiting each website and manually 
searching for a suitable contact address in the privacy policy, the contact section, and 
the imprint of the site. If available, we preferred data protection-specific addresses such 
as “datenschutz@” to general-purpose addresses like “service@” or “info@”. 
On 8 December 2017, we sent out solicitation emails to all 152 insurers, using a 
university mail account not affiliated with the PrivacyScore project. As most insurers 
had not replied with a definitive response after four weeks, we sent out reminders to 
135 insurers on 11 January 2018. The majority of responses was received in January 
and February 2018. After we had received all responses (March 2018) we iterated over 
them multiple times for open coding. As two of the authors are part of the PrivacyScore 
team, we were also in the position to receive any complaints directed towards the 
platform (which was not communicated to the recipients). 
5 Results 
In this section, we report the results of the initial scan of the websites and how site 
operators responded to our solicitation mails. Afterwards we discuss the three primary 
response types, i.e., positive responses, complaints, and other responses, in more detail. 
5.1 Initial State of Websites 
At the beginning of the study (T1), 26% (39) of the websites did not use any third-party 
tracking. 67% (102) of the websites used a well-configured Transport Layer Security 
(TLS) setup (defined as automatically forwarding users to the encrypted version of the 
website, offering TLS 1.2 and not offering the outdated and insecure protocol versions 
SSLv2 and SSLv3), and only 26% (39) of the websites set a HTTP Strict Transport 
Security (HSTS) header. Mail server TLS scans exhibited a failure rate of 6.5% (15), 
likely due to spam protection techniques like tarpitting. Still, 78% (119) websites had 
a well-configured mail server TLS setup (with TLS 1.2 and without SSLv2 and SSLv3). 
5.2 Contacts and Respondents 
In total, we received responses from 41 insurers (response rate: 27%). We found that 
sending a reminder message greatly increased the response rate, with more than half of 
the responses (23 of 41) reaching us only after the reminder. We had contacted 97 data 
protection (DP) contacts (64% of 152 insurers; A=45, B=52) and 55 general-purpose 
contacts (A=31, B=24). The overall response rates of Group A and B are similar 
(A=26%, B=28%), with data protection contacts showing a slightly higher rate 
(A=29%, B=31%) than general-purpose contacts (A=23%, B=21%).  
We also observed many instances of messages being forwarded inside the 
companies, with different departments responding to our inquiries. An overview is 
given in Table 1. In Group A, our messages were frequently answered by marketing 
and data protection or IT teams (40% and 35%, respectively). Members of the board of 
directors (20%) and other departments (5%) sent the remaining 25% of responses. 
In Group B, we observed a markedly different behavior. The majority of the 
responses were written by data protection and IT specialists (71%), while the remainder 
was evenly split between marketing, board members, and others. This deviation can 
only partially be explained by the larger number of DP contacts in Group B (A=45, 
B=52): The fraction of data protection and IT responses is higher in Group B for both 
messages sent directly to a DP contact (A=35%, B=75%) and for messages sent to a 
general-purpose contact (A=14%, B=60%). 
5.3 Types of Responses 
Overall, the responses fall into one of the following three categories: Firstly, there are 
positive responses, e.g., statements of gratefulness, expressions of interest in the study, 
and very detailed discussions of the scan results. Secondly, there are complaints 
criticizing the nature of the unsolicited scans and the publication of the scan results. 
Thirdly, there are other responses, ranging from acknowledgements of the receipt of 
our message to explicit expressions of indifference. The heat map in Fig. 1 provides a 
summary of the results by breaking down the responses according to their response 
type. It also indicates the relationship between response type and changes to the 
website, which we will analyze in Sect. 5.4 in more detail. All direct quotes in this paper 
are our translations of German replies. 
Positive Responses. In total, we received 16 positive responses (A=9, B=7). In Group 
A, most responses came from the marketing (5) and data protection / IT departments 
(3), with a single response from a board member. In Group B, the responses came 
almost exclusively from data protection or IT departments (6), with only a single 
response from a marketing department. The responses varied widely in length and level 
of detail, ranging from single-sentence responses thanking us for the information and 
noting that the IT department would be investigating the report further, to differentiated 
technical and economic analyses of the trade-offs between user privacy and economic 
success for their company. For example, B58 explained that while they used tracking 
services on their websites, they were disabled in sensitive areas, and noted that 
“tracking is above all about the care with which data is handled. The mere collection 
of data does not necessarily lead to better business success.” A33 noted that while they 
did not forward users to the secure version of their website by default, all sensitive data 
(login information, payment details) were transmitted over a secure connection. 
Two respondents claimed that they would be making changes based on the results 
of the scan: A67 gave a detailed response, referring to many individual test results in 
detail, and demonstrated that they had already reacted by implementing some changes, 
like enabling the Referrer-Policy6 HTTP header. They also noted that some parameters 
related to the mail server were outside of their control, as they were managed by a third-
party appliance. A63 responded that internal tests had confirmed the findings of 
PrivacyScore and mentioned nonspecific changes that were made to the website as a 
result. They also noted that “the results helped us protect the privacy of the users of our 
website [and provided] valuable support for the implementation of changes based on 
an easier analysis and identification of weak points.” In contrast, A35 noted the beta-
status of PrivacyScore, but claimed that they would be performing their own checks to 
confirm the results, and act upon them, if necessary. 
                                                          
6 https://www.w3.org/TR/referrer-policy/ (accessed 2018-11-19) 
Table 1. Recipients and Respondents 
Group A  Group B 
Sent to Response From Count 
 
Sent to Response From Count 
General DPO / IT 1 General DPO / IT 4 
 Marketing 3   Marketing 1 
 Board Member 1     
 Other 2     
DPO DPO / IT 6  DPO DPO / IT 4 
 Marketing 5   Marketing 1 
 Board Member 1   Board Member 2 
 Other 1   Other 1 
 
Finally, A91 provided a highly detailed response, going into some detail on the trade-
offs between user privacy and economic success in online tracking. They noted that 
online tracking was required to evaluate the effectiveness of their online affiliate 
marketing campaigns. An additional concern was the analysis of the needs of potential 
customers, noting that “we determine the needs of new and existing customers through 
market research studies. However, [...] their results are only of limited significance. 
This can be seen in the fact that statements determined by market research and actual 
user behavior partially contradict each other.” Another concern was personalization, 
with the respondent noting that “both market research and measurements show that 
personalized content [...] is used much more intensively by users and is increasingly 
expected, [which] can only be fulfilled by tracking tools and marketing automation. 
[...] Of course, users also have a high interest in sufficient protection of their privacy. 
However, we are convinced that the data protection regulations in force in Germany 
[...] cover the expectations of most users.” 
Several respondents noted that they were already using external scanners to validate 
the security of their websites and that they commissioned professional security audits 
for their websites. Almost all respondents (A=7, B=5) forwarded the report to their IT 
departments for further analysis. There were also cases of respondents not being aware 
of alternatives to the privacy-invasive technologies they were using, with one 
respondent showing surprise when being informed about privacy-enhancing 
alternatives to their current practices. 
Complaints. We received nine complaints, all of them from public insurers. As Group 
A contains a higher ratio of public insurers, we would have expected more complaints 
from this group. However, the majority of complaints came from Group B (A=3, B=6). 
Most complaints came from companies whose site had a poor rank in the initial scan 
(min 25, mean 80, median 87, max 123 of 125). Four of the nine complaints (A=1, B=3) 
were raised directly with the PrivacyScore team, i.e., not by replying to our solicitation 
mail. In one case, we received a positive reply to our solicitation email, while the 
PrivacyScore team received a complaint two days later. Eight of the nine companies 
requested to be excluded from future scans. 
In the following, we will give an overview of the concerns raised in the complaints. 
We observed that the tone of the responses was generally more terse in Group B. Five 
of the six complaints from Group B explicitly referenced the ranking. One of the three 
complaints from Group A explicitly referenced the fact that the results were publicly 
 
Figure 1. Breakdown of responses according to response type 
available. One frequently raised point was that the scan was performed (B=2) and 
published (A=1, B=2) without asking for permission in advance. Three companies 
(A=1, B=2) claimed to be investigating if the scan constituted an illegal attack on their 
infrastructure, B150 alleged a violation of competition law, and A109 argued that the scan 
violated their copyright. In contrast, legal scholars concluded that PrivacyScore is fully 
compliant with German law [21].  
Of particular interest is the complaint by B150, which we will discuss in more detail 
here. After obtaining a low rank in the initial scan, their information security officer 
contacted the PrivacyScore team, asking to exclude the website from future scans. 
Almost two months later another response reached the PrivacyScore team, this time 
from the chief legal officer, stating that the legal department of the company had 
analyzed the case and had raised a number of issues with how the results were being 
displayed. In particular, they objected to a perceived incomprehensibility on how the 
rankings were computed and how old results from excluded websites were maintained. 
They claimed that this could be “damaging to their company”, and may be illegal under 
the law against unfair competition. At the same time, they acknowledged that they were 
open to critical analysis of their website. In a subsequent phone call, the company 
explicitly mentioned the competitive and privacy-sensitive nature of the public health 
insurance market and the disadvantages a company could experience from a low rank 
in such a privacy ranking. A constructive discussion resulted in several changes to 
PrivacyScore being proposed and implemented, adding various clarifications to the 
results pages to make it easier for visitors to understand what they (do not) imply. In 
return, the insurance company started work to improve some of the security and privacy 
properties of its website. However, they still declined to be added back to the ranking. 
Other Responses. We received 16 neutral reactions (A=8, B=8). Six organizations 
(A=4, B=2) explicitly stated that they were not interested in participating in the study. 
Five others (A=1, B=4) replied that our message had been forwarded internally, but we 
did not receive another response from them. Organization A153 declined participation, 
citing insufficient capacity, and B40 stated that responding would entail a work order to 
an external service provider. A51 stated that they could not give any information on the 
topic of privacy. B94 states that they did not understand the provided information. 
Finally, A95 simply stated that they would not be making any changes to their website. 
5.4 Changes to the Websites 
To evaluate how websites changed over the course of the study, we performed 
measurements before sending our messages (T1) and repeated them at the end of the 
study (T2), skipping insurers that had asked to be excluded from future scans. 
Twelve companies had stated that they were open to changing their website (A=6, 
B=6). However, at T2, only 4 (A=4) had actually made changes to one of the parameters 
measured by PrivacyScore. The total number of embedded third-party trackers (TPTs) 
increased over the course of the study period, from 411 to 439, which can be explained 
by a general inflation of the number of service providers in the market for behavioral 
advertising. We observe 12 (A=7, B=5) cases of at least one TPT being removed, and 
13 (A=7, B=6) cases of at least one TPT being added.7 Most of these websites belong 
to companies that did not respond to our messages. A63, who had responded positively 
and promised to make changes, only replaced one TPT with a different one. A91, who 
had provided us with a differentiated view of the trade-offs between privacy and 
economic success, appears to have briefly removed a number of third parties, but has 
since added them again. A133 had stated their willingness to adapt their website – and 
indeed, they have removed all trackers, leaving only a cookie consent script hosted by 
a third party. Conversely, A74 responded positively to our message, but only discussed 
the security aspects of the PrivacyScore evaluation, without regard to the privacy 
ratings. Their website added four additional trackers over the course of the study. 
Several companies also made changes to the security of their systems by changing 
the configuration of their TLS setups. Four companies (A=3, B=1) disabled the 
outdated and insecure protocol version TLS 1.0, and two of them (A=1, B=1) also 
disabled TLS 1.1, leaving only the latest available version TLS 1.2 active. Five 
companies (A=3, B=2) enabled HTTP Strict Transport Security, while one (B=1) 
disabled it. However, none of them had responded to our message, so it is unknown if 
this happened as a reaction to our messages, or due to other, unrelated reasons. 
Similarly, 10 companies (A=6, B=4) started automatically forwarding all visitors to the 
secure version of their websites. Closer investigation revealed that while none of them 
had responded to our messages, five are maintained by the web design agency 
maintaining the website of B128, who had asked to be excluded from future scans and 
threatened legal action. A manual visit of their website revealed that they, too, now 
forwarded all visitors to the secure version of their website. Thus, it is plausible that 
our messages were at least partially responsible for this agency-wide change. 
Our observations indicate that insurers are willing to deploy changes that benefit the 
privacy interest of users without impacting the economic interests of the insurer (e.g., 
enabling a more recent TLS versions). If privacy and company interests are in conflict, 
companies are more reluctant to make a change (cf. the smaller number of insurers that 
removed third-party trackers from their site). 
To put our results into context we compare the impact of our solicitation mails with 
the effect of regulatory changes (cf. Fig. 2). For this purpose, we scanned the websites 
once more in August 2018 (T3). Besides the introduction of the GDPR in May 2018, 
the timeframe also included new PCI DSS rules coming into effect in June 2018,8 
requiring websites that process credit card payments to update their TLS configuration.  
Due to technical issues with PrivacyScore, scans for 10 sites reproducibly failed and 
had to be excluded in T3. Moreover, we observed significantly higher failure rates for 
the mail server TLS scans in T3 than in T1 and T2, precluding a meaningful comparison 
in this area. Cursory investigations indicate that the failures are due to the increasing 
prevalence of spam defense mechanisms deployed by mail server operators. 
                                                          
7 We consider individual third parties, not the total number. Thus, if a website removes one third 
party and adds a different one, it will be counted in both groups. 
8 https://blog.pcisecuritystandards.org/are-you-ready-for-30-june-2018-sayin-goodbye-to-ssl-
early-tls (accessed 2018-09-11) 
As expected, the changes between T2 and T3 are substantial. 19 sites9 removed all 
third parties, while 4 sites reintroduced trackers (compared to 2 and 1, respectively, in 
our study). 16 improved their TLS configuration (compared to 11 in our study), with 6 
adding and 1 removing HSTS (5 additions and 1 removal in our study).10 
Even though the time between T2 and T3 is much longer than between T1 and T2, 
it is unlikely that the observed differences are only due to the different durations given 
the changes to two regulatory frameworks. While we cannot infer what reasons served 
as an incentive for insurers to improve security and privacy features of their websites 
between T2 and T3, the combination of the passage of time and new regulatory 
requirements has a higher impact than our solicitation messages. This is to be expected, 
as the GDPR and PCI DSS changes were important and widely publicized, with strong 
incentives for compliance. While regulation has a large effect, transparency can still 
remain a valuable tool in affecting changes, as regulatory changes are infrequent events. 
Furthermore, regulation only establishes a lower bound of acceptable behavior, without 
incentives for exceeding the minimum requirements. Since the minimum requirements 
still permit many privacy-invasive techniques, transparency can serve as an incentive 
to exceed these requirements, which is vital for improving the state of online privacy. 
6 Discussion 
In this section, we discuss our results and their implications. The goal of our research 
was to investigate how health insurance companies react to transparency through public 
                                                          
9 This includes 10 websites operated by the same association of insurers, whose websites are 
centrally managed. Thus, the number of distinct organizations making changes is at most 10. 
10 The difference with the changes visible in Figure 2 is due to some websites moving to the 
excluded or failed category 
 
Figure 2. Scan results of health insurer websites at different points in time 
security and privacy ratings of their websites (RQ1) and if knowledge about the results 
being displayed in a ranking changes their response (RQ2). 
We found that the responses varied greatly in the level of detail and content, ranging 
from detailed analyses of the trade-offs between user privacy and economic success to 
terse legal threats seeking removal from the public ranking. The responses cited a 
variety of reasons for the current state of their websites, ranging from conscious trade-
offs between user privacy and the economic success of their company to technical 
limitations, e.g., third-party appliances whose configuration cannot be changed. One 
respondent also identified tension between the users’ expectations of personalized 
content, which necessitates tracking, and user privacy. 
6.1 Rankings Create Antagonism 
We observed that public health insurers are more likely to complain than private 
insurance companies. Multiple complaints cited the privacy-sensitive nature of the 
health insurance market, and the potential competitive disadvantages caused by a bad 
privacy result. This led to a number of companies asking to be excluded from future 
scans, often under the threat of legal action based on questionable legal bases, including 
copyright, competition law, and cybercrime legislation [21]. 
We also observed a higher proportion of complaints from Group B (A=3, B=6), 
which was explicitly informed that their website was part of a ranking. This seems to 
indicate that the public ranking led to a higher probability of complaints being made. 
This theory is supported by the fact that five of the six complaints from Group B 
explicitly referenced the ranking in their complaints.  
The complaints also have in common that all of them passed through the data 
protection and/or IT department of the companies, either as the initial point of contact 
for our study, or through company-internal forwarding. Thus, at first sight, a competing 
explanation for the higher ratio of complaints from Group B may be that the data 
protection and IT departments generally have a higher likelihood to complain. 
Coincidentally, we sent a higher fraction of our mails directly to data protection 
contacts in Group B (A=59%, B=68%), which corroborates the competing explanation. 
However, there are two arguments that challenge its validity: Firstly, several responders 
explicitly referenced the ranking in their complaints, and secondly, the complaint rate 
is still higher for Group B if only messages passing through data protection and/or IT 
departments are considered (A=21%, B=30%). Thus, we give more credence to our 
initial theory, which confirms RQ2. 
6.2 Reasons for the Reluctance to Change 
Our scans indicate that the websites under study are in permanent flux, with a general 
trend towards increasing the number of third-party trackers. As many of the insurers 
whose website changed during our study did not respond to our messages, the effect of 
our study on the websites is hard to quantify. Based on the received responses, we can 
attribute four changes directly to our messages, including one company that stopped 
using third-party trackers altogether, and assume that six more changes are at least 
partially the result of our messages. While these changes improve the privacy and 
security of website visitors, the low number of overall changes shows that the 
effectiveness of the messages was limited, indicating that at least in its current state, 
transparency and rankings through PrivacyScore do not significantly influence the 
willingness of most website operators to change their websites. 
Many responses matched the acquiescent approach proposed in the IA [5], stating 
that they were in full compliance with applicable laws without giving additional details. 
A small number of companies moved towards the proactive approach by elaborating 
more on their internal processes, stating that tracking was disabled in critical areas, or 
citing frequent security audits of their websites. 
We distil three reasons for the current state of insurance company websites: 
Conflicting value propositions, missing awareness, and negligence. Firstly, companies 
operate in a field of tension between their own economic goals (e.g., evaluating the 
effectiveness of their marketing campaigns), their reputation, and (sometimes 
conflicting) customer expectations like privacy and personalization. If not all 
expectations can be fulfilled, a trade-off needs to be found, leading companies to 
evaluate the costs of each solution. Stated in terms of the RbV [5], by gathering 
customer data (intellectual resource), companies can satisfy their own goals and some 
of the user expectations (e.g., personalization). As the use of web tracking is ubiquitous, 
it incurs almost no reputational cost and thus has low potential for differentiation 
(relational resource), leading most companies to pursue a knowledge focus and value 
their own economic goals higher than the privacy interests of their customers. This also 
explains their observed reluctance to be included in a ranking, making them favor an 
intentionally intransparent strategy, as proposed by Gerlach et al. [7]. 
Secondly, website operators may not be aware of alternative solutions that allow 
them to maintain the utility of their current solutions while decreasing their impact of 
the privacy of their users. Such alternative solutions include self-hosted tracking 
software like Matomo (matomo.org) that keeps the data under the control of the 
company, or two-click social media buttons (github.com/heiseonline/shariff) that do 
not disclose information to social networks on every page view. 
Lastly, website operators may have been negligent and forgotten to configure their 
website correctly to respect the privacy of their users. This could manifest as the failure 
to enable the IP anonymization feature of Google Analytics (which is mandatory in 
Germany), or not forwarding visitors to the encrypted version of the website. 
Problems caused by negligence can in many cases be remediated by a notification to 
the website operators, although such notifications have been shown to not always be 
reliable [17]. Raising awareness for privacy-preserving alternatives cannot easily be 
done at scale. In addition, awareness alone is not sufficient, as deciders need to be 
convinced that the benefits of switching to a privacy-preserving solution are worth the 
required effort and potential costs of changing the website, leading back to the issue of 
conflicting value propositions. These can only be influenced by changing the costs 
associated with the different options, which is easiest in the area of reputational costs. 
In the context of online privacy this means that privacy-invasive techniques have to 
become reputationally “expensive”, which would turn forgoing their use into a 
relational resource, allowing differentiation through the proactive approach. This idea 
is at the center of the PrivacyScore project. However, our evaluation has shown that at 
the moment, the effect of transparency through PrivacyScore is not sufficient to cause 
large-scale changes. It is unclear if this is a general result or an artefact of the relatively 
unknown PrivacyScore platform. After all, companies may be more inclined to perform 
changes if a well-known consumer group or news outlet published a privacy ranking. 
Finally, the behavior of companies can also be influenced by legislation and 
regulatory oversight. This was confirmed by our post-GDPR scan, which showed 
changes in a larger number of websites. Thus, the upcoming European ePrivacy 
regulation is a promising avenue for affecting further changes at scale. 
7 Limitations, Future Research and Conclusion 
Our study is subject to limitations. Firstly, we only investigate a single, privacy-
sensitive sector – health insurance – in a single country. Extending and replicating the 
study with different sectors and in different countries could shed additional light on the 
general applicability of the results. Secondly, the number of respondents does not allow 
us to draw statistically significant conclusions. Our analysis also only considers two 
fixed dates when evaluating changes to the websites of the included companies, and we 
do not investigate if improvements are sustained over time or reverted. 
Another limitation is the permeability of the group assignments. While we did not 
inform members of Group A about the ranking feature of PrivacyScore, the scan results 
page contains a (non-prominently presented) link to the ranking. Thus, members of 
Group A might have learned about it on their own. Nevertheless, we observed notable 
differences between Group A and B, which indicates that many members of Group A 
have not taken notice. The last limitation is the nature of PrivacyScore. As a relatively 
new platform, the publicity provided by it may present less of an incentive for change 
than a more popular and well-known platform or publication would have provided. 
In conclusion, our results show that transparency – in the form of public assessments 
– can improve privacy features of websites. However, such efforts can also result in 
complaints and legal threats. A major factor limiting the willingness to change is the 
conflict between user privacy and the perceived need for privacy-invasive analytics for 
economic success: our solicitation mails led to much larger changes in areas where 
company and user interests are aligned, like website connection security. Another factor 
contributing to the current state appears to be a lack of awareness about privacy-
preserving alternatives to common tracking services. While our study provided some 
initial insights on these difficulties, evaluating the effects of transparency on privacy 
remains a promising avenue for future work, for instance when publishing assessments 
in more widely disseminated channels like newspaper articles. 
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